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DISCOVERY OF EXPERT OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL
AND CALIFORNIA COURTS
To determine the singularly most important issue in a condemna-
tion proceeding-the amount of just compensation !- - the parties liti-
gant must rely heavily upon the reports of expert appraisers.2 In
eminent domain controversies, therefore, the issue of whether or not
the knowledge and opinions of expert appraisers are discoverable by
the adverse party before trial is of particular significance.3 The recent
Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. Meyer 4 carried the federal
courts beyond prior holdings by allowing complete discovery of the
adverse party's expert appraisers (including opinions and conclusions)
in a condemnation action.5 The purpose of this comment will be to
examine the federal practices concerning discovery of expert knowl-
edge and opinion in condemnation proceedings, and to compare this
practice with that of California.
I. Background- The Federal Rules
The procedural framework for pre-trial activities of parties within
the federal system is governed by the deposition-discovery process
established by the Federal Rules. 6 Accordingly, a brief examina-
tion of those federal rules most directly affecting condemnation pro-
ceedings is necessary to a clear understanding of the development of
the law in this field.
As originally promulgated for condemnation proceedings, the Fed-
eral Rules governed only the procedure for appeals. 7 Because of this
lack of an established procedure for the overall condemnation of prop-
erty, there was little uniformity in federal condemnation actions.8 As
1 See, e.g., United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D.
Ark. 1962).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968).
3 See generally, 6 P. NIcHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoiAIN § 26.22
(rev. 3d ed. 1965).
4 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968). This decision has been acclaimed as a
"landmark opinion" by at least one source. See The Recorder, July 23, 1968,
at 1, col. 6.
5 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968).
6 See 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff f 26-37 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, f 71A.20[2], at 2673.
8 Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 357 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as Armstrong, Report].
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a result of this confusion, Federal Rule 71A was enacted9 on August 1,
1951, to provide a uniform procedure for condemnation in the federal
district courts.10 However, while Rule 71A prescribes the specialized
procedure required for the condemnation of land, it does not delineate
any special rules for discovery in condemnation actions. Rather, it
adopts the framework of the general deposition-discovery rules con-
tained in Rules 26 through 37.11 Thus, since August, 1951, the dis-
covery procedures in federal condemnation actions have been gov-
erned by Federal Rules 26 through 37.12
The purpose of formulating these Rules was, in the words of Jus-
tice Douglas, "to make a trial less a game of blind man's bluff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the full-
est practical extent."'13 Further, Rule 1 provides that these rules shall
be liberally construed:'14 "[The Rules] shall be construed to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."'15
The three important rules forming the basis of discovery are Rules
26, 33, and 34. Rule 26 establishes the procedure for taking the depo-
sition of the adverse party's expert witness. 6 Rule 33 provides a pre-
trial method of obtaining written interrogatories from an adverse
party, and from the adverse party's expert appraiser. 17  Rule 34 re-
quires, upon the showing of good cause, "the discovery and production
of documents and things for inspection, copying or photographing."' 8
In a condemnation action, the request under Rule 34 is usually for
lists of comparable sales, or documents containing factual information
upon which an appraisal has been based. 19 But if the expert's con-
9 J. MooRE & H. FmnK, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIc,--RULEs PAMPHLET 1129
(1968) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's RULEs PAMPHLET].
10 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 2763.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 71A: "The rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts govern the procedure for the condemnation of real and
personal property under the power of eminent domain, except as otherwise
provided in this rule." Moore explains the interrelation of Rule 71A and the
other Federal Rules as follows: "Subdivisions (b)-(1) of Rule 71A pre-
scribe such specialized procedure as is required by condemnation proceed-
ings; and, subject to their provisions, subdivision (a) provides that the other
Federal Rules govern the procedure. In the language of the Committee, the
purpose of subdivision (a) is to utilize 'the general framework of the Federal
Rules where specific detail is unnecessary.' Full play, therefore, be given to
the other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 'except as otherwise provided' in
Rule 71A." 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 2765 (footnotes
omitted).
12 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 2764-65.
Is United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958).
14 MooR's RULEs PAMPHLET, supra note 9, at 207.




19 See, e.g., United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (1962).
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clusions are made discoverable, as in United States v. Meyer,20 future
requests under Rule 34 will probably be directed at the appraiser's
report itself.
One important aspect of Rule 26 is the delineation of the permit-
ted scope of examination. That rule provides that the deponent may
be examined concerning any non-privileged, relevant matter.21 This
scope of examination applies not only to Rule 26, but also to Rules 3322
and 34.23 Thus the scope of discovery should be the same regardless of
the method selected by the party seeking discovery.
24
The promulgation of Rules 26 to 37 satisfied an historic need for
specific legal machinery in the federal courts to disclose and to narrow
the real issues in dispute between the parties and to afford an ade-
quate factual basis for preparation for trial.25 The landmark decision
of Hickman v. Taylor2  described the deposition-discovery mechanism
established by Rules 26 to 37 as "one of the most significant innova-
tions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 27  The opinion ex-
plained the purpose of the deposition-discovery procedure developed
in the Federal Rules,23 and then succinctly stated the policy under-
lying the promulgation of these discovery rules:
[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing
expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the rele-
vant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.
To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever
20 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b): "[T]he deponent may be examined regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or the defense of the exam-
ining party or to the claim or defense of any other party.... It is not
ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the
testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence."
22 Rule 33 states that: "Interrogatories may relate to any matter
which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b) ... Y
23 Rule 34 allows discovery of materials "which constitute or contain
evidence relating to any of matters within the scope of the examination per-
mitted by Rule 26(b) ......
24 See 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, [ 33.02.
25 Id. [ 26.02[l], at 1031.
26 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
27 Id. at 500.
28 The Hickman case explains that: "The various instruments of dis-
covery now serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under
Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2)
as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or
whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil trials in the federal
courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear,
consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial." Id. at 501 (footnote
omitted).
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facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure
simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled
from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the
possibility of surprise.29
H. Discovery and Condemnation in the Federal Courts
A. Various Judicial Attitudes Concerning the Extent of Discovery
The pre-trial discovery of expert opinion is not prohibited per se
by the Federal Rules. 30  Restrictions beyond those found in Rule
26(b), 31 which endure in the federal system, have developed in the
decisions handed down by the federal courts themselves.32 Concern-
ing the lack of statutory guidance and the resulting want of uniform-
ity, one recent decision explains that "the District Courts have been
left much to their own devices with a resultant diversity of opinion in
regard to discovery of expert opinion.133 Apart from United States
v. Meyer,34 the federal courts can be divided into four groupings ac-
cording to the restrictions they have developed.
1. No Discovery Concerning Appraisers
The first group of federal district courts hold that, in condemna-
tion actions, the opponents are not even entitled to obtain the names
and addresses of appraisers.35 This complete bar to discovery is ap-
plied to appraisers that will be called at trial, as well as to those ap-
praisers used exclusively for trial preparation. There are two ration-
ales frequently given for such denial. The first is that since the major
purpose of discovery is the narrowing of the issues for trial, there is no
need for discovery in condemnation because just compensation is al-
most always the sole issue in a condemnation action.36 The second
29 Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).
30 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b).
31 See the statement of the limitations in Rule 26(b) at note 21 supra.
32 See, e.g, United States v. Selby, 25 F.R.D. 12, 14 (N.D. Ohio 1960),
where the court, in discussing discovery by interrogatories, restated the pre-
vailing view today that interrogatories may not call for legal conclusions.
33 United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 413 (N.D. Cal.
1965), affd as modified sub nom. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th
Cir. 1968).
34 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
35 United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512, 520 (W.D. Ark.
1962) (discovery rules should be liberally construed in the interest of jus-
tice, but no discovery in condemnation action); United States v. 6.82 Acres of
Land, 18 F.R.D. 195, 197 (D.N.M. 1955) (absolute denial of discovery of ap-
praisers' names); United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D.
Ga. 1954) (names of government appraisers not obtainable by property own-
ers); Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88, 89 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (disallowed
interrogatories seeking names and addresses of expert appraisers).
30 E.g., United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga.
1954); see United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Ark.
1962).
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rationale for such denial is that the condemnee, and not the condem-
nor, has the burden of establishing the market value of the con-
demned land, and, therefore, is not entitled to discovery.3 7
2. Discovery Limited to Facts
The second group of federal district courts allow discovery of facts
upon which the appraisal reports are based, but will not allow dis-
covery of the reports themselves or of the opinions of the appraisers
contained in the reports.38 These are the courts that have formu-
lated the general rule of non-discoverability of opinionative materi-
als.39 Within the group, however, there are courts that attempt to
expand the area of permissible discovery while retaining the basic
fact-opinion distinction. For example, one court has suggested the
adoption of a liberal approach in distinguishing facts from opinions;
40
while another court has held that unprivileged factual data are dis-
coverable even though connected in some way with the appraisal
opinion.41 Nevertheless, in theory, these courts continue to permit
the discovery of facts only.
3. Discovery of Comparable Sales Data Permitted
The third group of federal district courts allow discovery of com-
parable sales data before trial in condemnation actions.42  This data
consists of those sales that, according to one New York decision, are or
should be taken into consideration in determining the fair and reason-
37 See, e.g., United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D.
Ga. 1954).
88 United States v. 4.724 Acres of Land, 31 F.R.D. 290, 292 (E.D. La. 1962)
(no discovery of opinionative material without special circumstances);
United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75, 77-78
(E.D.N.Y. 1962) (discovery limited to facts upon which opinions or conclu-
sions are based); United States v. 19.897 Acres of Land, 27 F.R.D. 420, 422-23
(E.D.N.Y. 1961) (no conclusions, merely facts); United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192, 193 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (no discovery of opinion-
ative materials without special circumstances); United States v. 50.34 Acres
of Land, 12 F.R.D. 440, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (earlier hearing allowed discovery
of appraisal report, however, discovery limited to facts and comparable sales);
see United States v. 48.19 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 462 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
89 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192, 193 (N.D.
Cal. 1959).
40 United States v. 284,396 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75,
78 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
41 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192, 193 (N.D.
Cal. 1959).
42 United States v. 3595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617, 618-19 (NJ).
Cal. 1962) (should be required to exchange comparative sales before trial);
United States v. 19.897 Acres of Land, 27 F.R.D. 420, 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1961)
(exchange lists of sales); see United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D.
440, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). See generally Carter, Pre-Trial in Condemnation
Cases, A New Approach, 40 Am. JurmcrAL Soc'y 78 (1956).
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able value of the condemned property.43 The interest in discovery of
such comparable sales is generated by the fact that such lists of sales
are said to be the best evidence of fair market value.4 4 In addition,
such evidence would provide the opponent's experts with a firm basis
upon which to establish their own appraisal reports. Courts that re-
fuse to permit discovery of opinions, therefore, could still allow dis-
covery of comparable sales data.
4. Discovery of Some Expert Opinion Allowed
The final group of federal district courts allow some discovery of
the adverse party's expert opinion.45 However, in each case so hold-
ing the extent of discoverable opinion has been limited.46 The im-
portant fact remains, however, that these courts are at least willing
to venture into this difficult area47 and to allow to some degree the
discovery of expert opinion.
5. General Federal Practice-No Discovery of Expert Opinion
The four classifications of the federal district courts demonstrate
the diversity that exists in the federal system. Out of this diversity,
however, has developed one generally accepted view-there can be no
discovery of the opinions and conclusions of experts.48 This general
limitation has been of critical significance because of the importance
43 United States v. 19.897 Acres of Land, 27 F.R.D. 420, 423 (E.D.N.Y.
1961).
44 United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1952);
Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391, 397 (1st Cir. 1944); see United States
v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 345 (1923).
45 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 598 (D. Md. 1963);
see United States v. 1,278.83 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 320, 321 (D. Va. 1952).
46 In United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 595 (D. Md.
1963), what was sought by the interrogatories was the opinion of the ex-
perts on a certain aspect of the value. The interrogatories fell short of ask-
ing the expert to state his ultimate conclusions about the valuation to be
placed on the land. In United States v. 1,287.83 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 320,
321 (D. Va. 1952), discovery of some opinion was allowed, but discovery of
the value placed on the land was not allowed.
47 See generally Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's
Expert Information, 14 STAw. L. REV. 455 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Friedenthal]; Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 111 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Long, Discovery];
Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39 (1965); Note, Developments in the Law-
Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rnv. 940 (1961).
48 Cases cited notes 36-43 supra; Ferguson, Pretrial Discovery of Expert
Opinion, 4 Amz. L. REV. 267, 268-69 (1963); Tane, Discovery of Trial Prepara-
tions in the Federal Courts, 50 COLUm. L. Rnv. 1026, 1049-51 (1950); Wright,
Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39, 56-57 (1965); Note, The Scope of Discovery Under
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 15 So. CAI. L. REv. 677, 691-92
(1963); See Note, Discovery-Opinion Of Adverse Partys' Prospective Ap-
praiser, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 510 (1963).
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of expert opinion in the proper adjudication of the issues of condem-
nation cases, for example, in the determination of land values.49
Even when discovery of opinions is permitted, the party seeking
discovery will have to display extreme need, and demonstrate his
inability to obtain expert opinion on the same matter from another
source.50  Moore extends a formula that conforms to the policy of
these courts:
The court should not ordinarily permit one party to examine an expert
engaged by the adverse party, or to inspect reports prepared by such
expert in the absence of a showing that the facts or the information
sought are necessary for the moving party's preparation for trial and
cannot be obtained by the moving party's independent investigation
or research. 51
At one time the controversy over the discoverability of expert
opinion was of such magnitude that the Advisory Committee on
Amendments to the Federal Rules recommended that the conclusions
of experts be given statutory immunity from discovery. Under this
proposed amendment,52 which was never adopted,53 the only expert
opinions and conclusions that could have been discovered would have
been those found in the report of a physician who examined a plaintiff
in a personal injury suit.54 Despite the decision not to adopt the pro-
posed amendment, most courts continue to hold that in a condemna-
tion action there can be no discovery of expert opinion.
55
49 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968).
50 Kaskell, United States and Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 13 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, 15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kaskell]; see,
e.g., Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 188 F. Supp. 135 (D. Pa. 1960).
51 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, f 26.24, at 1531.
52 Armstrong, Report, supra note 8, at 356. The proposed amendment
stated that: "The courts shall not order the production or inspection of any
writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party [or] his attorney . . . in
anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied that the
denial of production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking
the production or inspection in preparing his claim or defense .... The
court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of the writing
that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert."
(Footnote omitted). See also 2A W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFr, FEDERAL PRACTIc E
m PnocEDuRE § 652.5, at 153-54 (Wright ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
BARRON & HOLTzOFF].
53 Such a restriction on discovery of a writing that reflects the conclu-
sions of experts was established in the State of New Jersey. N.J. REv. R.
4:16-2. For an application of this rule, see Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
15 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1954).
54 Armstrong, Report, supra note 8, at 356; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b),
for the discovery of physician's report.
55 See, e.g., United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512, 519
(W.D. Ark. 1962).
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B. Arguments Against Discovery of Opinions
There are several traditional arguments for denying discovery of
expert opinions especially in condemnation actions.56 The first argu-
ment57 is that, since the principal objective of discovery is to ascertain
facts that may assist in the preparation or trial of the proponent's
case, such procedure is not relevant to a condemnation action. "Opin-
ions of experts, as disclosed by appraisal reports, do not purport to
present facts or factual data necessary or required for the proponent's
preparation or trial."58 1 Thus the distinction is made between "facts
found by an expert and the conclusions he has formed."59  While
this distinction is common in condemnation cases, especially where the
land owner wants to examine the reports of appraisers retained by
the condemnor, 60 at least two leading writers criticize any such dis-
tinction.6 1
The second argument is that the material sought to be discovered
is readily available to the opponent,62 and thus he lacks the necessary
good cause required for discovery. 6 3 This argument not only denies
the opponent the production of reports of the adversary's experts, but
prevents him from taking the depositions of these experts on the
ground that in all cases "duplicate expert testimony is at least theo-
retically available." 64  As one supporter of this argument explains,
in a condemnation action, "[e]xpert opinion and the factual data
upon which such opinions are predicated are readily available to both
parties and should not be the subject of discovery or examination
before trial. ... "65
56 For an extended discussion of these arguments see United States v.
23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596-98 (1963); Friedenthal, supra note 47,
at 460-62; Long, Discovery, supra note 47, at 123-42; Note, Discovery of Ex-
pert Opinion in Land Condemnation Proceedings, 41 IND. L.J. 506, 507-13
(1966); Note, Pretrial Discovery in Condemnation Proceedings: An Evalua-
tion, 42 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 52, 56-69 (1967).
57 See cases cited note 38 supra.
58 Dolan, Federal Condemnation Practice-General Aspects, 27 APPRAISAL
J. 15, 19 (1959).
59 Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39, 57 (1964).
60 Id. at 57 n.56.
61 Friedenthal, supra note 47, at 473 ("It is impossible to justify such a
distinction"); Long, Discovery, supra note 47, at 144-45 ("The distinction be-
tween fact and opinion is particularly without merit when we are concerned
with experts").
62 United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga.
1954); see United States v. Certain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98, 101 (N.D.
Ga. 1955).
03 United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195, 197 (D.N.M. 1955);
see United States v. 4.724 Acres of Land, 31 F.R.D. 290, 292 (E.D. La. 1962).
04 Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1038
(1961).
05 Dolan, Federal Condemnation Practice-General Aspects, 27 APPRmsAL
J. 15, 19 (1959).
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One answer to this theory of availability is given in a recent case66
that emphasizes the subjective nature of expert opinions. Such an
opinion cannot be classified as "available" since it is obtainable only
from the person holding it, namely the expert.67 Or, as the court in
United States v. Meyer expressed it:
The appraisers' opinions and their factual and theoretical foundation
are peculiarly within the knowledge of each appraiser and, to a de-
gree, that of the party who employed him. The opposing party can
obtain this information in advance of trial only by discovery ... 68
Another answer to the theory of availability is that a party sel-
dom desires just to "learn" about information of the opposition.
Rather, a party wishes to know, through discovery, the use to which
this information will, or has been, put.6 9
The third agrument for denying discovery of expert opinions is
that to allow such discovery would be to violate the attorney-client
privilege. In one quite ingenious case,7 0 a non-condemnation action,
it was successfully argued that a neurologist-psychiatrist who exam-
ined the party to the suit at the request of that party's attorney was
no more than a messenger through which the party communicated to
his attorney. The information communicated, therefore, was held to
be protected by the attorney-client privilege.7 1 The general rule,
however, is that the attorney-client privilege will not protect knowl-
edge of a third party but only the communication between an indi-
vidual and his professional legal advisor;7 2 and as one writer explains,
the expert is clearly not a professional legal advisor, nor is he a trans-
mission agent between the client and the attorney. His knowledge,
therefore, should not be protected by the attorney-client privilege.7 3
The trend in the federal courts 4 is now toward the exclusion of the
expert from the protection of the attorney-client privilege.75
The fourth argument against discovery of expert opinion, the one
that has probably caused the most difficulty, is often labeled the rule
of Hickman v. Taylor.70  According to Hickman, an attorney's "work
product" should be given a qualified immunity from discovery pro-
cedures "in order to preserve the lawyer's independence and thus in-
66 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963).
67 Id. at 596.
68 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968).
69 Long, Discovery, supra note 47, at 128.
70 San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
71 Id. at 237, 231 P.2d at 31.
72 Note, Discovery of Expert Opinion in Land Condemnation Proceed-
ings, 41 IND L.J. 506, 507 (1966).
73 Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege:
The Expert Witness, 42 U. DEr. L.J. 473, 478 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Gardner, The Expert Witness].
74 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D. Md. 1963).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 73 (9th Cir. 1968).
76 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see, e.g., Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39, 46 (1964).
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directly, the adversary system. ' 77 The materials sought through dis-
covery in Hickman8 were statements obtained personally by an at-
torney in his trial preparations. The "work product" rule, however,
was extended in Alltmont v. United States0 to bar discovery of in-
formation obtained by an agent of the attorney.
The question, therefore, is whether the facts gathered by the ad-
verse party's prospective expert appraiser, or his appraisal report, are
within the "work product" doctrine. The better reasoned answer is
that such information is not within the protection of the "work prod-
uct" doctrine.8 0  Two recent federal condemnation cases8 ' have said,
in effect, that even if the information gathered by an expert for an
attorney is within the "work product" privilege, the privilege is
merely a qualified one, not an absolute one, and the good cause that is
necessary to discover material so privileged is provided by the very
nature of a condemnation action.
8 2
The final traditional argument, found in the "mrore modern and
better reasoned cases,"83 was first stated in Lewis v. United Airlines
Transport Corp.8 4 Lewis reasoned that to permit one party to use
another's expert opinion is unfair, especially since the latter party
has paid the full expense of obtaining the information. Allowing dis-
covery here would be substantially a taking of the opponent's prop-
erty without just compensation." Rebuttal to this reasoning is sim-
ple: the court can condition discovery upon the moving party's will-
ingness to pay a reasonable portion of the expert's fee and upon
agreement to mutual discovery.88 . Such conditional discovery is in the
77 2A BARRON & HoLTzOFF, supra. note 52, § 652.2, at 131.
78 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
79 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
80 2A BARRON & HoLTZOFF, supra note 52, § 652.2, at 131; 6 P. NICHOLS,
THE LAw OF EMINENT Doim § 26.22, at 259 (3d ed. 1965); Gardner, The Ex-
pert Witness, supra note 73, at 500-01; Friedenthal, supra note 47, at 479-80;
Comment, Discovery-The Work Product Protection, 13 KAN. L. REV. 125, 128
(1964); 10 N.Y.L.F. 574, 577-78 (1964).
81 United States v. 3595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617, 618 (N.D.
Cal. 1962); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 236 (S.D.
Cal. 1953).
82 United States v. 364.82 Acres. of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 414-15 (N.D. Cal.
1965), aff'd as modified sub nomn. United- States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir.
1968); see United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596-97 (D. Md.
1963).
83 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 597 (D. Md. 1963).
84 32 F. Supp. 21 (D. Pa. 1940).
85 United States v. Certain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98, 100 (M.D. Ga.
1955); see United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195, 197 (D.N.M.
1955). See generally Friedenthal, supra note 47, at 482-83;. von Kalinowski,
Use of Discovery Against the Expert Witness, 40 F.R.D. 43, 50-51 (1967).
86 United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 415 (N.D. Cal.
1965), affd as modified sub nom. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th
Cir. 1968); United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 597 (D. Md.
1963); United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19, 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
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proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 7
C. United States v. Meyer-Complete Discovery
Considering the variety of pretrial practices utilized by the federal
district courts, the recent case of United States v. Meyer8 8 is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, it is the only decision of a United States
Court of Appeals on the discoverability of appraiser's opinions and
reports in a condemnation action. Second, and more important, it
applies the doctrine of complete discovery, including final opinions or
conclusions of an expert appraiser in a condemnation action.8 9 While
some writers90 and courts"1 have contended that earlier condemnation
decisions9 2 had allowed discovery of the final opinions93 or conclu-
sions94 of appraisal experts, this contention is not well-founded 5
87 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts relating
to Deposition and Discovery, 43 F.R.D. 211, 226 (1968) (Proposed Rule 26(b)
(4) (c) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules].
88 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
89 Id. at 69.
90 Long, Discovery, supra note 47, at 117 n.44; Note, Pretrial Discovery in
Condemnation Proceedings: An Evaluation, 42 ST. Joms L. REV. 52, 56 n.23
(1967).
91 United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 413 (N.D. Cal.
1965), aff'd as modified sub nom. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th
Cir. 1968); United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 595-96 (D.
Md. 1963).
92 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963);
United States v. 3595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1962);
United States v. 60.50 Acres of Land, 23 F.R.D. 287 (N.D. Ohio 1959);
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); United
States v. 1,278.83 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 320 (D. Va. 1952).
93 United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 413 (N.D. Cal.
1965).
94 Note, Pretrial Discovery in Condemnation Proceedings: An Evalua-
tion, 42 ST. JoHNs L. REV. 52, 56 n.23 (1967).
95 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963),
comes closest to allowing complete discovery. However, the opinion of the
court specifically states that the interrogatories fell short of asking the expert
to state his ultimate conclusions about the value of the property. United
States v. 3,595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1962), allows
the exchange of comparable sales data without an inquiry into matters of
opinion or work product. United States v. 62.50 Acres of Land, 23 F.R.D.
287 (N.D. Ohio 1959), permitted interrogatories about the existence of docu-
ments supplied to the appraisers by the government. This discovery is of
the existence of the documents and not the contents. Also note that the docu-
ments were those of the government and not of the appraisers. United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953), stated that
the opinions are and will remain wholly incompetent and immaterial as evi-
dence unless and until the appraisers are called as witnesses at trial. There-
fore, pretrial discovery of opinions was denied. United States v. 50.34 Acres
of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), allowed discovery of the appraisal
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In United States v. Meyer, the condemnee issued notices for tak-
ing depositions of the government's96 three real estate appraisers.
9 7
The appraisers appeared at the time and place stated in the depo-
sition request, but would testify only to the fact that they had been
employed by the government and that they had received remunera-
tion for such employment. 98  The government sought a protective
order99 to prevent much of the interrogation,100 which was denied by
the lower court.1°1 On appeal, Judge Browning succinctly disposed of
the government's arguments. Concerning the proposition that the in-
formation was mutually available, the court said that the vital infor-
mation sought was not available from other sources. The condemnee
sought to discover the opinions of the government's appraisers and
the basis upon which these opinions rested. This information could
only be obtained from the appraisers themselves.
10 2
In reply to the government's contention of a distinction between
facts and opinions, the court held that there is no fact-opinion distinc-
tion in the Federal Rules. "Rule 26(b) extends discovery broadly to
'any matter not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter,
involved in the pending action.' ",103 This conclusion eliminating the
distinction between fact and opinion has been considered the better
view,10 4 particularly where experts are concerned.10 5
Finally, the government contended that the information was im-
mune from discovery under the "work product" doctrine. After not-
ing the Hickman rule'0 6 and the Alltmont extension,10 7 Judge Brown-
report in the first hearing. However, in the later hearing to determine the
permissible scope of the discovery, the court limited the discovery to facts
and comparable sales and denied access to opinions. United States v. 50.34
Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 440, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). United States v. 1,278.83
Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 320 (D. Va. 1952), held some opinions discoverable,
but these opinions were in no way concerned with the appraiser's valuations.
96 In this case the federal government was the condemnor. It is possible
for a private individual or corporation or a quasi-public corporation, rather
than the local, state or federal government, to be the condemnor in a condem-
nation action.
97 The condemnee sought to take the depositions under Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
98 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 68 (9th Cir. 1968).
99 The government sought the protective order under Rule 30(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
100 United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 412 (N.D. Cal.
1965), aff'd as modified sub nom. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th
Cir. 1968).
101 Id. at 416.
102 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 72 (9th Cir. 1968).
103 Id. at 73.
104 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE, supra note 6, 26.16[4], at 1195.
105 Long, Discovery, supra note 47, at 144-45.
106 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
107 Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
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ing excluded appraisers from the "work product" privilege:
Ordinarily, appraisers are not employed in condemnation matters to
act as advisors to counsel. . . . [They are] usually employed to fur-
nish expert opinions as to the value of the property taken. The ap-
praisers' opinions and the data and analysis upon which they rest are
interdependent elements which together constitute the product of the
appraisers' expertise. They do not become work product of the at-
torneys merely because the attorneys confer and counsel with the ap-
praisers; they are not immunized from discovery merely because
the appraisers may have set them out in reports to counsel.' 0 8
Having disposed of the traditional arguments, the court then pro-
ceeded to the argument raised in more recent cases, 0 9 that of unfair-
ness. The court first answered this argument by explaining that "the
courts have broad power to control the timing of discovery [and]
limit its scope.""10 The court then stated conditions that if placed on
discovery, would avoid any unfairness-namely, the payment of a
reasonable share of the expenses involved, and the assurance that
discovery will be reciprocal."'
Finally, the Meyer court justified discovery of expert opinion
from a practical standpoint:
Because land appraisal is complex and technical, usually evidence on
the issue of value consists principally of the opinions of opposing ex-
perts. These opinions are notoriously disparate. The weight to which
an appraiser's opinion testimony is entitled turns upon the validity of
the appraiser's premises, procedures, and theories; the soundness of
his factual determinations; the comparisons he has made; the methods
he has followed, and the formulae he has applied. Basically, the trial
of a condemnation suit consists of the admission into evidence of the
opinions of the opposing appraisers and the factual and theoretical
bases upon which they rest, and the testing of those opinions by cross-
examination and rebuttal.
... Since this material will constitute the substance of the trial,
pretrial disclosure is necessary if the parties are to fairly evaluate
their respective claims for settlement purposes, determine the real
areas of dispute, narrow the actual issues, avoid surprise, and prepare
adequately for cross-examination and rebuttal. 112
United States v. Meyer was the first federal case to permit such
complete discovery of expert conclusions in a condemnation action,
but the case is not without support from at least two sources: other
case law and proposed Federal Rules amendments."
3
108 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 74 (9th Cir. 1968).
109 See, e.g., United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 597
(D. Md. 1963).
110 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 75 (9th Cir. 1968).
"' Id. at 75-76. For application of such conditions, see United States v.
23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 597 (D. Md. 1963); United States v. 50.34
Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19, 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
112 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968).
11" Other supporting material is found in the court's footnotes. See id.
at 70 n.4.
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1. Case Authority
Support for the Meyer holding can be found outside the field of
eminent domain. While there are cases that have denied discovery"
14
or have limited it to factual information, 115 there are a great number
of decisions that have extended discovery to opinions" 6 and to con-
clusions"1 7 of experts employed by the adverse party. Most important
is the large number of very recent cases that have extended discovery
to include the expert's ultimate opinions."18 The remaining require-
ment most common in such cases, evidently created in accordance
with the policy of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules,1 9 is that such dis-
covery substantially served the purpose of leading to the issues and of
expediting the law suit. 20 This more relaxed discovery practice has
found support with several writers,' 12 and the trend is definitely
toward the more liberal discovery rules.
1 22
2. Proposed Amendments
Another support for the extension of the discovery process is
"14 Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 188 F. Supp. 135, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Rob-
ertson v. Graham Corp., 14 F.R.D. 83, 84 (D. Mass. 1952).
"15 Hoagland v. TVA, 34 F.R.D. 458, 460 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); Maginnis v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. La. 1962); Walsh v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1954).
116 United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967); Seven-Up Bot-
tling Co. v. United States, 39 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Colo. 1966); United States v. 38
Cases, 35 F.R.D. 357, 362 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 33 F.R.D. 306, 308 (D. Del. 1963); United States v. Nysco Labs. Inc., 26
F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 318 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1963).
117 Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 632, 636 (W.D. Mich, 1965);
Stonybrook Tenants Ass'n v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165, 168 (D. Conn. 1961);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 217 (D. Del. 1960);
Broadway & Ninety-Sixth St. Realty Co. v. Loews, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347, 359-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
118 Empire Scientific Corp. v. Pickering & Co., 44 F.R.D. 5, 6-7 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); Besly-Welles Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 368, 372-73 (D. Wis. 1968);
Technograph, Inc. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 416, 418 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Diversified Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center, 42 F.R.D. 3, 4-5 (D. Md. 1967);
Federal Cartridge Corp. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 531, 534-
35 (D. Minn. 1967).
119 Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "[The Rules]
shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action."
120 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Texas Okla. Express Inc., 43 F.R.D. 336, 338
(D. Okla. 1967); Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 632, 636 (W.D.
Mich. 1965); see Stonybrook Tenants Ass'n. v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165, 168
(D. Conn. 1961).
121 7 MoolE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE, supra note 6, 71A.20[3], at 2767; Gard-
ner, The Expert Witness, supra note 73, at 500-01; Winner, Procedural Meth-
ods to Attain Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 97, 101-03 (1962); 39 NomE DA : LAW. 96,
100 (1963).
122 Goldstein, The Discovery Process in Highway Land Acquisition, 14
AM. U.L. REv. 38, 67-69 (1964).
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found in the most recent draft of the proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules.123 Under these proposals, a party would be able to dis-
cover those experts that his opponent expects to call at trial, and the
subject matter upon which each expert will testify. The party could
then discover from the experts facts known and opinions held that are
revelant to the stated subject matter. These proposed amendments
had a definite effect on the decision of the court in United States v.
Meyer 124 and should have a substantial effect on future decisions.
D. Expert-Advisor or Witness-An Important Distinction
One aspect of the expert problem, noted in United States v.
Meyer,12 5 that is very often overlooked is the fact that the expert
can serve in two separate capacities. He may be requested to advise
counsel on matters pertaining to trial preparation, including the ques-
tion of whether the situation merits litigation at all, or he may be
employed to prepare and give expert testimony at trial. In the
most common situation, the expert is probably retained to serve in
both capacities. 126 Although appraisers are not ordinarily employed
to act exclusively as advisors to counsel, 127 it is a very possible situa-
tion;1 28 and thus the distinction merits attention.
The Hickman case 1 29 reasoned that the proper preparation of a
client's case demands that the attorney be allowed to prepare his legal
theories and to plan his strategy without undue interference. 8 0 This
includes the right to investigate the subject thoroughly without the
fear of uncovering unfavorable evidence that could then be obtained
by the opponent. This is the rationale behind a recent California
condemnation decision: 131 "[A]n attorney should be allowed to pre-
pare his case thoroughly and 'to investigate not only the favorable but
the unfavorable aspects of such cases. . . " ,,132 If the information
discovered by such an expert investigator or advisor were not privi-
leged, then every probe could be the step that later proves fatal to
the proponent's case.
The situation is different in the case of an expert who is retained
as a witness. The protection of his opinions from discovery can defeat
the purpose of the deposition-discovery procedure. In discussing cases
that present intricate and difficult issues in which expert testimony
123 Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules, supra note 87.
124 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
125 Id.
126 Swartzman v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 195, 202, 41 Cal. Rptr.
721, 726 (1964).
127 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 74 (9th Cir. 1968).
128 See, e.g., Mack v. Superior Court, 259 A.C.A. 1, 66 Cal Rptr. 280
(1968).
129 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
130 Id. at 511.
131 Mack v. Superior Court, 259 A.C.A. 1, 66 Cal Rptr. 280 (1968).
182 Id. at 5, 66 Cal Rptr. at 283.
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is likely to be determinative (such as the' issue of valuation in an
eminent domain action), one writer explains:
In cases of this character, a prohibition against discovery of informa-
tion held by witnesses produces in acute form the very evils that
discovery has been created to prevent. Effective cross-examination
of an expert witness requires advance preparation. The lawyer, even
with the help of his own experts, frequently cannot anticipate the
particular approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on
which he will base his testimony on the stand.133
The recent proposed amendments to the Federal Rules meet this
problem directly by a rewriting of Rule 26134 to include a distinction
between an "expert retained or specially employed by another party
in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial,"'135 and an expert
expected to be called "as an expert witness at trial."'3 6 The amend-
ment would set a stricter standard for discovery of materials pre-
pared by, or opinions held by, an expert who is not a prospective
witness. This would not be an absolute privilege, but a qualified
privilege:
[A] party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of liti-
gation or preparation for trial only upon the showing that the party
seeking discovery is unable without undue hardship to obtain facts
and opinions on the same subject by other means or upon a showing
of other exceptional circumstances indicating that denial of discovery
would cause manifest injustice.
137
This provision repudiates'3 8 the idea that an "expert's informa-
tion is privileged simply because of his status as an expert.'
1 39 It
also attempts to avoid the "work product" doctrine advanced by some
courts,1 40 prefering to adopt the more recent test
141 of fairness. 42
While this concept of qualified privilege is not new,143 it is made
more effective by dividing the experts into witness and non-witness
groupings. If the expert is classified as a non-witness, discovery would
be permitted under the proposed amendment only if the party seek-
ing discovery is unable to obtain the information he needs from his
own expert.
144
On the other hand, the proposed amendment would allow more
freedom of discovery in the case of experts who will be called at
133 Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules, supra note 87, at 234.
134 Id. at 224-28.
135 Id. at 225 (Proposed Rule 26(b) (4) (A).
136 Id. at 225-26 (Proposed Rule 26(b) (4) (B)).
137 Id. at 225.
138 Id. at 233.
139 Armstrong, Report, supra note 8, at 356.
140 See, e.g., Mack v. Superior Court, 259 A.C-.A 1, 3, 66 Cal. Rptr. 280,
282-83 (1968).
141 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 597 (D. Md. 1963).
142 Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules, supra note 87, at 233.
143 See 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, f 26.24, where this
concept of qualified privilege is traced back to Hickman.
144 Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules, supra note 87, at 233-34.
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trial. Under the proposed change, a party, by means of interrogato-
ries, could require the opponent to identify the party or parties whom
he expects to call as expert witnesses at trial and the subject matter
on which each of the experts is expected to testify.145 The party
could then "discover from the expert or the other party facts known
or opinions held by the expert which are relevant to the stated sub-
ject matter."' 46 This proposal is intended to solve the problems
that appear in cases presenting intricate and difficult issues likely to
be decided by expert testimony, such as "food and drug, patent and
condemnation cases.' 47 In these cases, discovery of expert witnesses
is needed for effective cross-examination and rebuttal, and yet dis-
covery is often denied.
148
There are two areas in which difficulties could arise under the
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules. First, since this discov-
ery is limited to trial witnesses, a party cannot discover the informa-
tion of the opponent's experts until that attorney has decided who will
actually be a witness at trial. The opponent might conveniently suf-
fer from acute indecision until the last possible moment and thereby
circumvent the purpose of the discovery provisions. This, however,
could easily be avoided by establishing a deadline for the selection of
such expert witnesses. Then, expert witnesses not identified in a
response to an interrogatory, on or after the established date, could
not be called at trial, unless good cause is shown for the late selec-
tion.1
49
The second possible problem may arise from the following pro-
posed provision: "Discovery of the expert's opinions and the grounds
therefor is restricted to those previously given or those to be given on
direct examination at trial."' 50 This provision is not crystal clear and
could result in a controversy requiring too much interpretation on
the part of the federal district courts concerning the scope of dis-
covery. What exactly does "previously given" mean? If continuity
is to be retained, the phrase means previously given on direct exam-
ination at trial. If this interpretation is correct, then the phrase is
completely otiose and should be eliminated to avoid unnecessary con-
fusion. Information previously given at trial should be acquired
through a court transcript to avoid unnecessary work on the part of
145 Id. at 225 (Proposed Rule 26(b) (4) (B) (i)).
146 Id. at 225-26.
147 Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
148 See cases cited notes 35-42 supra.
149 This practice recently has been codified in California to provide for
exchange of information in eminent domain proceedings. The code requires
the exchange of lists of experts and the subject matter of their testimony.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1272.046. Teeth have been added by providing that an
expert must be on the list, or have a good reason why he is not on the list,
or he will not be allowed to testify. Id. § 1272.05-.06.
150 Proposed Rule 26 (b) (4) (B) (ii). Proposed Amendments to Civil
Rules, supra note 87, at 225-26.
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the opponent's expert and to provide an exact statement of opinion
given at the trial.
The other phrase--"to be given on direct examination at trial"--
should present no difficult problem since the proposed amendment
requires a party, upon request, "to state the subject matter upon
which the expert is expected to testify."'151
The consequences of distinguishing between an expert advisor
and an expert witness are illustrated by two recent decisions. 152 In
United States v. Meyer,'5 ' the appraisers were found to be potential
witnesses, and the court reasoned that their opinions and the facts
and theories supporting their opinions were admissible in evidence
at the trial. Since such material "can be obtained only from the ap-
praisers themselves, [this information] should be discoverable if the
purposes of the Federal Rules are to be effectuated."' 54 In Mack v.
Superior Court, 55 the information of the appraiser was obtained ex-
clusively for the opponent's attorney to aid him in preparing his case,
and the appraiser was not to be called as a witness during the trial.
The court reasoned that information concerning the expert and his
opinions was not discoverable in the absence of evidence that such
denial would result in unfair prejudice to the party seeking discov-
ery. 56
The adoption of a policy distinguishing between witness and non-
witness experts would allow discovery where it is most needed and
curtail it where it is most likely to be harmful. By far the most lucid
reasoning was given in the California case of Swartzman v. Superior
Court:
57
[T]he expert normally wears two hats. He is employed by counsel
to form an opinion which he may later present as a witness in court.
He is also engaged as an adviser on trial preparation and tactics for
the case and in this latter capacity serves as a professional consultant
to counsel on the technical and forensic aspects of his speciality.158
Concerning the expert as an advisor and professional consultant
the court explained that the expert's freedom to advise counsel and
to educate him on the technical problems of the case "without hin-
drance from the opposing side, are important elements of counsel's
privacy of preparation." 59 However, the court concluded that this
protection should not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the liberal
discovery procedures:
When it becomes reasonably certain that an expert will give his pro-
15' Id. at 225.
152 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); Mack v. Su-
perior Court, 259 A.C.A. 1, 66 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1968).
158 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
154 Id. at 74.
155 259 A.C.A. 1, 66 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1968).
156 Id. at 5, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
157 231 Cal. App. 2d 195, 41 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1964).
158 Id. at 202, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
159 Id. at 202, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
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fessional opinion as a witness on a material matter in dispute, then his
opinion has become a factor in the cause. At that point the expert has
ceased to be merely a consultant and has become a counter in the liti-
gation, one to be evaluated with others. Such evaluation properly in-
cludes appropriate pretrial discovery.160
E. Agent-Employee vs. Independent Appraiser
There is one final distinction that deserves brief mention. Some
courts proclaim a distinction between an appraiser who is an actual
employee of the condemnor, and an independent appraiser that has
been hired to form a valuation of the locus in quo [land in ques-
tion] .161 The distinction rests upon basic agency principles. The act
of an agent is the act of the principal if done with the authority of the
principal and within the scope of the agency relationship. 62 Based
upon this theory, a communication otherwise privileged does not lose
this privileged character merely because it was obtained by an em-
ployee of the client and conveyed by this employee to the attorney,
so long as it was communicated with the employer's knowledge and
within the scope of the employee's authority.
163
To enjoy a privileged status, however, the communication must
emanate from the client, and not from his advisor.0 4 In Oceanside
Union School District v. Superior Court,1 5 the report of an independ-
ent appraiser was held to be discoverable. 66 In People ex rel. De-
partment of Public Works v. Glen Arms Estate,167 an appraisal report
of an employee of the California State Division of Highways was
ruled the report of his employer; and since it was prepared for trans-
mission to the attorney and was intended to be confidential, it was
held to be within the attorney-client privilege.
168
HI. California-Discovery in Eminent Domain
The problem of the discoverability of experts in the area of
eminent domain is comparatively new in California. In fact, "dis-
covery was practically unused in condemnation proceedings before
1957."109 Prior to that date, effort to take depositions were usually
160 Id. at 203, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
161 Compare People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Glen Arms Es-
tate, Inc., 230 Cal. App. 2d 841, 41 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1964), with Oceanside
Union School Dist. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 180, 373 P.2d 439, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 375 (1962).
162 See generally W. SEAvEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw or AGENCY (1964).
163 D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 737, 388 P.2d
700, 710, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 478 (1964).
164 See, e.g., Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d
180, 188, 373 P.2d 439, 444, 23 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (1962).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 230 Cal. App. 2d 841, 41 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1964).
168 Id. at 857, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
169 Huxtable, Trial Preparation, Discovery, Pretrial, and Jury Instruc-
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unsuccessful when resisted by the opponent.1 70 The California statute
then in effect 71 provided that the attorney-client privilege "encom-
passed all reports compiled by agents in anticipation of litigation;"'172
and the state bar had insisted that "all trial preparations of an attor-
ney were absolutely protected from discovery."'173 In 1957 the legis-
lature added new sections to the Code of Civil Procedure,'174 sub-
stantially adopting the discovery mechanism of Federal Rules 26
through 37.175
The first test of the new code provisions in a condemnation pro-
ceeding came in Rust v. Roberts,176 in which the condemnees, through
interrogatories, requested the names and addresses of the appraisers
and the contents of the appraisers' reports. 77 The court accepted the
State's claim that, since the attorneys for the State requested it to
employ appraisers to investigate, appraise and report, and since the
report was delivered to the attorney in confidence, the report was
privileged from discovery under section 2016(b) of the Code of Civil
Procedure. 7 s The court held that the report of an expert was within
the attorney-client privilege simply because it was prepared by an ex-
pert in anticipation of trial.
179
In commenting on this decision, one writer explained that "[i] f the
Rust rule is followed, interrogatories will have little value in condem-
nation cases .... 180 However, within a year Grandlake Drive-In,
Inc. v. Superior Court'8 ' initiated a series of decisions that narrowed
the scope of the privilege given in Rust. The state court of appeal in
Grandlake held that an expert's opinion was not privileged merely
because it had been communicated to an attorney. 8 2  In Mowry v.
Superior Court,'83 the court of appeal explained that pretrial discov-
ery could be obtained from the condemnor's expert upon the show-
ing of good cause, although it did not abrogate the rule that the ap-
praiser's reports were within the attorney-client privilege. 8 4 Thus,
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while the condemnee could not discover the report itself, he was not
precluded from questioning the appraiser regarding his opinions con-
cerning the value of the land and other related matters.
In People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Donovan,185
the California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's finding that
the knowledge possessed by an expert was within the attorney-
client privilege.186 The opinion stated that such knowledge is priv-
ileged only when it is acquired by an expert while acting as an agent
of transmission between client and attorney.
18 7
The final overthrow of the attorney-client privilege for experts
in California came in three cases decided by the California Supreme
Court. 88 In the first case, 89 a condemnation action, the court held
that the opinions of real estate appraisers concerning the value of the
property were not within the attorney-client privilege and thus were
not protected from pretrial discovery on that ground. 90 In the second
decision, following a request for the discovery of an architect's valua-
tion, the court expressly disapproved those portions of Mowry v.
Superior Court'91 and Rust v. Roberts192 that declared the report of
an expert real estate appraiser made to an attorney to be privileged
as a matter of law.193 In the third decision, movies taken by an inde-
pendent investigator in anticipation of litigation were held not to be
within the attorney-client privilege. 94 Moreover, since an earlier
California Supreme Court decision had held that the federal "work
product" privilege did not exist in California, 95 the three cases rea-
soned that a claim of "work product" was merely one factor to be
considered by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion in deter-
mining whether discovery should be granted. 96
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Subsequent to these cases, the California Legislature, on the
recommendation of the State Bar,197 attempted to provide a statutory
solution for the "work product" problem:
The work product of an attorney shall not be discoverable unless the
court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the
party seeking discovery in preparing his claim or defense or will re-
sult in an injustice .... 19
8
This statute was intended to provide the privacy necessary to en-
courage attorneys to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investi-
gate the unfavorable, as well as the favorable, aspects of each case.
The statute was also intended to prevent one attorney from taking
undue advantage of his opponent's work. 99 The courts applied the
statute by requiring a showing of "good cause" to obtain the discovery
of "work product."200  The party seeking discovery was required to
demonstrate that denial of discovery would unfairly prejudice him in
preparing his claim or defense.
The status of "work product" has been greatly affected by a
recommendation made by the California Law Revision Commission to
establish mandatory pretrial exchanges of information in condemna-
tion actions.20 1 The Commission believed this exchange to be a neces-
sity in a condemnation action, explaining that the only substitute
for discovery for experts' valuation materials is lengthy and often
fruitless cross examination during trial.20 2 The recommendation was
not accepted when first introduced; however, it was restated in
1966.203 The Commission again advocated pretrial exchange, explain-
ing that "the obstacles to effective discovery in eminent domain cases
may be overcome by legislation providing for an exchange before trial
of written statements of valuation data.120 4 The technique suggested
was not new; it had been used in eminent domain proceedings in the
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Los Angeles Superior Court 20 5 and in the United States District
Court in Los Angeles20 6 for some time.
The recommendations were finally codified in Chapter 1104 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, effective November, 1967.207
Under this chapter parties are required to exchange lists of expert
witnesses intended to be called at trial and statements concerning the
subject matter of each expert's testimony.20 8 To insure "good faith"
exchange of lists of expert witnesses and essential valuation data, the
chapter provides that a party cannot, in the absence of a showing of
good cause, present an expert witness at trial unless the required
information about him and his testimony has been properly ex-
changed.20 9 This procedure is intended to provide a simplified
method for the exchange of valuation information. It is not manda-
tory, however, but applies only if it is invoked by a party to the pro-
ceeding.210 Further, the authors explained that this chapter was not
intended to supersede existing discovery procedures. 211 Finally, the
"good-cause" requirement found in ordinary discovery is not invoked
under this statute;212 and thus, when the existence of good cause is
questionable, the tendency will be to use pretrial exchange, rather
than regular discovery procedure.
The chief values of this system are to make the pretrial con-
ference serve a more valuable function in condemnation proceedings,
to allow more complete preparation for cross-examination and rebut-
tal, and to provide an atmosphere more conducive to settlement.
Comparison and Conclusion
In comparing the pre-trial discovery practice of California with
that of the federal courts, it can be seen that each court system has
followed the same basic pattern-early restrictions followed by a
tendency toward liberal discovery procedure. The attorney-client
privilege, once an almost insurmountable obstacle to the discovery of
opinions of the adverse party's experts has now been eliminated in
condemnation actions in both systems. Such expert opinion has been
held not within the privilege.213 While the "work product" rule is
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more of an obstacle to discovery in the California system, with its
mandatory requirement of a showing of good cause for the discovery
of "work product",214 good cause should be found to be inherent in
every condemnation action.215 In both systems, opinions formerly
considered immune from discovery have become discoverable. Fi-
nally, the procedure proposed for the United States Districts Courts,
216
if adopted, would accomplish the same basic result as that achieved
by the pretrial practice now required in California.217 This liberal
trend is not limited to California and the federal system, for develop-
ments in these two court systems reflect the developments in pro-
gressive states across the country.
218
This trend is desirable because of the uniqueness of eminent do-
main actions. The condemnee can be characterized as an "innocent
bystander" who is being dispossessed. He is innocent because the
sole reason for his involvement is his ownership of property needed
by the condemnor. The condemnee cannot justifiably deny the state's
power to take property for a public use, and usually will not be able to
prove a lack of right to take property in this particular condemnation
action. The condernee cannot recover the costs of litigation from the
condemnor; 219 and yet, if he does not challenge the value set by the
condemnor, the condemnee will be forced to accept that amount as
"just compensation" for the property taken.220 The value established
by the condemnor is presumed just, and the burden is upon the con-
demnee to prove otherwise. In most cases, the funds at the disposal
of the condemnee will be no match for those of the condemnor.
221
Thus, the condemnee has a financial disadvantage that can lead to
unfair results.
While opening "Pandora's Box"' 222 to allow the condenee full
access to government files would be unwise, a guarded relaxation of
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discovery rules in favor of the condenmee is warranted. The pro-
posed amendments to the federal discovery rules223 provide a desir-
able approach that is sufficiently flexible to allow discovery in a
proper case yet deny discovery when proper cause is not shown or
when it would unfairly injure the opponent.
The values of discovery are numerous. In a case relying on tech-
nical facts, such as one involving condemnation, it is almost impossible
to anticipate the particular approach that will be taken by the op-
ponent's expert. Thus cross-examination is made extremely difficult
by denial of discovery. 224 Similarly, effective rebuttal requires an
indication of the approach that will be taken by the adverse party's
expert. "If [this information] is foreclosed by a rule against dis-
covery, then narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which
discovery normally produces are frustrated. 225  The expert's con-
clusions are factual evidence at trial-often the exclusive bases for
determining fair market value. Since cross-examination is necessary
to demonstrate an expert's weakness, and since successful cross-ex-
amination will often require pre-trial discovery of complicated mat-
ters that make up the testimony, discovery will facilitate litigation.
220
The pre-trial exchange and the discovery procedures increase the
likelihood of settlements. Parties can determine whether the distance
between their valuations is great enough to warrant litigation.
227
The early discovery will also make the pre-trial conference more pro-
ductive. The parties can eliminate many inconsequential "issues."
This, together with more productive cross-examination, will lead to
shorter proceedings, and thus provide much needed relief to crowded
court dockets. 228 In addition, it seems both unfair and unrealistic to
refuse to permit pre-trial inquiry into the work of an expert. Such
refusal is contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules.
229
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